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ABSTRACT
This study examines the link between ownership structure and
political spending disclosure (PSD). We break down ownership into
four different groups of shareholders: institutional, insider,
governmental and foreign. Using a unique dataset provided by
CPA-Zicklin for PSD and a panel dataset from S&P 500 companies
between 2015 and 2018, our results reveal that institutional and
governmental ownership are positively associated with the level of
PSD, while insider ownership is negatively associated with the level
of PSD. Additionally, while prior literature mainly investigated how
ownership structure influences disclosure practices, we analyse the
mechanisms through which ownership characteristics influence
PSD. Our cross-sectional tests provide evidence that insider owners
exhibit more PSD if they are pursing tax-related lobbying expenses
and tax avoidance practices. Additionally, governmental owners
demand lower PSD in firms with higher nonfinancial and financial
reporting quality. Finally, institutional owners demand more PSD
in the case of lower industry concentration. Overall, we conclude
that different owners have distinct impacts and preferences on a
firm’s political strategy and various mechanisms uniquely
operationalise the interactions between different owners and
political transparency. Through agency theory, our results advance
heated debates on PSD – an emerging, yet hitherto less examined,
category of voluntary disclosure.
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Corporate political spending disclosure (PSD) continues to draw substantial attention
from firms, regulators and the media (Kong et al., 2017). Multiple large corporations
in the US have begun to voluntarily issue PSD to communicate their activities to share-
holders. According to the Centre for Political Accountability (CPA), the percentage of
S&P 500 firms which voluntarily report PSD increased from 5% in 2004 to over 60%
in 2016 (CPA, 2016), signalling an important research avenue.1 Corporate PSD is a
voluntary disclosure that informs stakeholders about a firm’s utilisation of shareholders’
resources towards political activities. It communicates useful, yet sensitive, information
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1Also, since more transparent political reporting became a major concern for many activist groups, the public and reg-
ulators, US Steel Corporation, for example, was forced to disclose its political contributions (Porter, 2015).
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that may bring additional risk, public scrutiny and reputation cost (Goh et al., 2020).
However, PSD is one of the most under-researched topics in the disclosure literature.
Mithani (2019) highlights the dearth of research on PSD despite significant demand
from multiple stakeholders for more political transparency. This paper addresses this
lacuna in literature by answering this research question: what is influence of ownership
structure on PSD?
Firms are increasingly spending significant amount of owners’ funds on political
activities to bring more benefits to shareholders (Chen et al., 2015).2 As ownership struc-
ture is heterogeneous in nature, given owners’ diverse horizons and objectives, the
relationship between PSD and ownership structure tends to be unclear and requires
more examination. Moreover, it is important for policy makers to capture the role of
ownership identity as a monitoring mechanism in corporate PSD policy. Recently, share-
holder proposals on PSD are among the most frequently submitted proposals (Baloria
et al., 2019) to the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and have become
the most commented proposals in the SEC’s history, with approximately 1.2 million
comment letters (Goh et al., 2020). Our research enquiry is timely given the significant
increase in the level of PSD and its attendant regulatory implications.
Theoretically, our research proceeds with the notions that corporate political spending
can be indicative of agency problems (Aggarwal et al., 2012) and that undisclosed politi-
cal spending can also increase agency costs. Undisclosed political contributions have led
activist groups such as the CPA to become more active and vocal in demanding higher
transparency over political spending (Baloria et al., 2019). Such demands were intensified
when the US Supreme Court banned direct donations from firms to candidates, while
allowing firms to freely advertise their opposition or advocacy for political candidates.
Also, the SEC has received substantial pressure to mandate PSD. As a result, there
have been calls for more understanding of the fundamental role of ownership structure
because of its strong effect on governance (Adegbite, 2010), global monitoring (Judge,
2011, 2012) and for investigating determinants and consequences of PSD (Beets &
Beets, 2019; Deboskey et al., 2018a, 2018b; Deboskey & Luo, 2018; Goh et al., 2020).
Using a sample of S&P 500 firms from 2015 to 2018, we explore the effects of different
ownership structures on PSD. Our results are as follows.
First, institutional ownership has a positive association with PSD, implying that insti-
tutional investment can be considered as an internal corporate governance mechanism
for promoting PSD transparency. Second, insider ownership is negatively associated
with PSD, suggesting that insiders tend to withhold important, yet sensitive, information
about political spending because of their concerns about its potential negative outcomes
and to preserve their influence. Third, governmental ownership has a positive association
with PSD, indicating that higher governmental ownership increases firm’s visibility and
public scrutiny and, thereby, leads to more transparent PSD. Fourth, foreign ownership is
not significantly associated with PSD. Consistent with agency theory, these results
suggest that different types of owners have divergent preferences toward a firm’s PSD.
Our results are robust to relevant econometric models that consider various types of
endogeneity problems, and to an alternative PSD proxy.
2According to the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), the total annual spending on political activities in the US averaged
more than $3.3 billion since 2008. In 2018, $3.45 billion was spent on corporate lobbying.
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Additional analyses provide evidence about the channels through which ownership
characteristics influence PSD. Since diverse owners have divergent preferences regarding
corporate political transparency, the ownership structure-PSD nexus may depend on
various mechanisms that can change owners’ perceptions regarding corporate political
transparency. Observably, Ozer and Alakent (2013) call for more research on investi-
gating the channels that operationalise the interactions between ownership structure
and corporate political strategy. In response, this study examines the mechanisms
through which ownership structures affect corporate political strategy by focusing on
issue-specific lobbying expenditures, tax avoidance, nonfinancial and financial reporting
quality, as well as industry concentration.
As corporate lobbying can create agency problems because such expenses can rep-
resent manager’s personal political orientation and not the interest of shareholders
(Chen et al., 2015; Kong et al., 2017), certain types of lobbying expenses may influence
ownership structure-PSD association. Additionally, prior research shows that ownership
structure can influence corporate tax avoidance strategies (McGuire et al., 2014; Minnick
& Noga, 2010). Similarly, Bauer et al. (2020) provide evidence on how aggressive tax
planning may allow certain shareholders to extract benefits from firm’s operations at
the expense of other shareholders. Motivated by these insights, we explore the effect of
issue-specific lobbying expenses and the degree of tax avoidance. Here, we provide evi-
dence that insider owners issue more PSD in the case of pursuing tax-related lobbying
expenses and tax avoidance. This implies that insider owners may strategically exhibit
greater political transparency to convince other stakeholders that they are not extracting
rents through tax lobbying and tax avoidance strategies.
Next, we examine how firm’s overall reporting quality operationalises the relationship
between ownership structure and PSD. Since owners’ demand for more transparent PSD
depends on the level of information asymmetry, it is expected that firm’s overall financial
reporting quality (as a proxy for information asymmetry) may influence the ownership
structure-PSD relationship. DeBoskey et al. (2020) argue that firms that exhibit higher
PSD could have higher nonfinancial and financial reporting quality. Further, Chaney
et al. (2011) provide evidence that politically connected firms can afford the conse-
quences of poor financial reporting quality because of political connections’ protection.
So, it can be argued that both nonfinancial and financial reporting quality may subsume
the influence of ownership structure on PSD. To address that, we examine whether nonfi-
nancial and financial reporting quality influence the ownership structure-PSD nexus and
provide evidence that governmental owners demand lower PSD in firms with higher
nonfinancial and financial reporting quality. This is consistent with the argument that
owners’ demand for more political transparency is lower when information asymmetry
is lower.
Then, we investigate how industry concentration affects owners’ perceptions regard-
ing political transparency. Industry competitors may use firm’s PSD to make inferences
about firm’s political connections and spending which can weaken firm’s political pos-
ition (Isidro & Marques, 2020). However, severe competition may motivate firms to
exhibit more PSD to reduce information asymmetry and secure additional capital
(DeBoskey et al., 2020; Goh et al., 2020). Motivated by such mixed views of industry com-
petition, we provide evidence that institutional investors demandmore PSD in the case of
high industry competition (low industry concentration), suggesting that institutional
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owners prefer greater political transparency in investee firms operating in competitive
industries to reduce information asymmetry and possibly secure external capital.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it adds to the debate on
PSD, which is an emerging and topical disclosure practice by investigating the influence
of ownership structure in driving firm’s political transparency. Second, this study extends
the drivers of corporate political reporting, beyond those already identified in the litera-
ture such as political connections, political donations and institutional investors (Goh
et al., 2020), gender diversity (Deboskey et al., 2018b), shareholder activism (Adegbite
et al., 2012; Baloria et al., 2019), CEO political preference (Cohen et al., 2019), corporate
community involvement disclosures (Yekini et al., 2017) and corporate presence on
social media platforms (Lei et al., 2019). Third, while prior studies examined the
influence of ownership structure on corporate disclosure policy, evidence on the analysis
of mechanisms that influence the ownership structure-PSD association is rare. Hence,
this study advances the literature by analysing the mechanisms through which ownership
structure affects PSD by exploring the influence of issue-specific lobbying expenditures,
tax avoidance, nonfinancial and financial reporting quality and industry concentration.
In sum, our study outlines mechanisms through which the public and shareholders
can influence PSD. Accordingly, policy makers and regulators may be able to
configure ownership structures to reflect better PSD. This paper proceeds as follows.
Section 2 reviews relevant literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework and
hypothesis development. Research methodology is in Section 4. Section 5 and 6 report
our main and additional analyses respectively. Section 7 concludes our study.
2. Literature review
2.1. Corporate political involvement
Firms connect politically using a combination of different tactics such as lobbying, pol-
itical action committee (PAC) contributions, soft-money donations to political candi-
dates and grassroots lobbying to gain access to politicians (Hillman et al., 2004). We
argue that PSD is a part of corporate political strategy. Corporations actively involved
in political activities may use PSD to signal their commitment and accountability regard-
ing the firm’s management of corporate treasury and owners’ funds. Thus, PSD can
facilitate lobbying objectives of corporations and their stakeholders. Politically connected
corporations enjoy various benefits, for example, reduced tax rates, better access to credit,
better prospects in obtaining government contracts (Goh et al., 2020), fewer enforcement
actions and penalties from the SEC (Correia, 2014) and achieving better firm perform-
ance even in low-corruption contexts (Amore & Bennedsen, 2013).
However, some studies argued that politically connected firms may be opaque and
often engage in risky activities that may bend existing rules (Correia, 2014; Yu & Yu,
2011). Given political connections’ superior knowledge regarding tax law and enforce-
ment changes, Kim and Zhang (2016) provide evidence that politically connected
firms are more tax-aggressive than their counterparts. Besides, politically connected
firms enjoy lower fraud detection rates, indicating that political connections can twist
corporate governance attributes at firm-level (Yu & Yu, 2011). Likewise, Chaney et al.
(2011) report that politically connected firms exhibit lower earnings quality than their
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counterparts, implying that poor-quality accounting information is not penalised
because of politicians’ protection. Recently, Elemes and Chen (2020) demonstrate that
clients of politically connected audit firms are less probable to engage in earnings restate-
ments, implying that political connections of audit firms have implications for audit
quality. However, political connections and spending may lead to the deterioration of
a firm’s reputation, with attendant financial, legal and performance risks (Mullins & Zim-
merman, 2010), raising a debatable question regarding the benefit of political connec-
tions to wider stakeholders.
2.2. Political spending disclosure
PSD is quite different from other types of voluntary disclosure. First, while some types
of voluntary disclosure (e.g. corporate social responsibility – CSR) have guidance for
their own form of reports, there is no specific guidance to report corporate political
activities. Second, while some voluntary disclosures have “specified” places in
annual reports, there is no requirement to include PSD in a specific place in
annual reports, raising concerns regarding consistency, readability and comparability
of PSD. Likewise, corporate political reporting is confusing and filled with terminol-
ogies that are difficult to understand by various stakeholders who are unfamiliar with
such nomenclature (Nathan & Finsbury, 2014). Third, while some voluntary disclos-
ure types are associated with a board committee, for instance the risk committee and
CSR committee respectively oversee risk and CSR disclosures, it is still uncommon for
the establishment of a specific committee for PSD. Fourth, PSD suggests a firm’s will-
ingness to spend significant amounts of owners’ funds on risky non-business pur-
poses.3 Disclosure of such activities signals a surplus in firm’s financial resources
that could have otherwise been spent on increasing shareholder wealth. Additionally,
PSD tends to be riskier than other forms of voluntary disclosure. While many forms
of voluntary disclosure do not invite social media backlash, PSD provides an oppor-
tunity for firm’s competitors to assault the firm, produce negative media coverage and
entice greater scrutiny from various stakeholders (Lei et al., 2019). Indeed, Bagley
et al. (2015) argue that various firms have been damaged by media reporting due
to financing of political parties.
However, we argue that PSD can be considered as a socially responsible practice
because corporations fund their political activities through shareholders’ funds. Given
the financial (Adegbite et al., 2019) and political (Uddin et al., 2018) dimensions of
socially responsible practices, corporations should be under fiduciary responsibility to
be transparent regarding PSD. Besides, corporations can strategically use PSD to
relieve any media backlash. For example, during the 2020 US elections, as pro-Trump
political contributions may lead to social media criticisms, corporations strategically uti-
lised anti-Trump PSD to derive social media commendations. Similarly, many compa-
nies such as Facebook, Deloitte, the Bank of America, Coca-Cola and Google
suspended their political donations after the violent events that took place in the
Capitol riots, suggesting that corporations review their political contributions in light
of recent events to satisfy their stakeholders (Goodwin, 2021).
3For example, in 2019, $3.5 billion was spent by US firms on lobbying activities.
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Notably, empirical research on PSD is still limited. Goh et al. (2020) reported that
institutional ownership, socially responsible institutional investors, political connections
and political contributions all have a positive effect on PSD. In addition, some studies
have recently explored factors influencing PSD, such as gender diversity (Deboskey
et al., 2018b), the existence of political contribution committee (Deboskey et al.,
2018a) and shareholder activism (Baloria et al., 2019). Furthermore, using data compiled
by the Federal Election Commission, Cohen et al. (2019) provided evidence that compa-
nies led by Republican CEOs exhibit lower PSD transparency. Finally, some studies argue
that firms that are actively present on social media platforms such as Twitter are under
high pressure to be more transparent about their PSD (Lei et al., 2019).
2.3. Ownership structure and political spending disclosure
Ownership structure has a significant effect on organisational relationships, decision
making, R&D spending, capital structure, diversification, innovation and labour
decisions (Alhababsah, 2019; Duqi et al., 2020; Hall, 2016; Oh et al., 2011). Also, owner-
ship structure significantly influences voluntary disclosure in general (Allaya et al., 2018;
Chau & Gray, 2002; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Zaini et al., 2020), and specifically CSR
(Khan et al., 2013), integrated reporting (Raimo et al., 2020), forward-looking financial
disclosure (Liu, 2015) and risk disclosure (Ntim et al., 2013). However, the relationship
between ownership structure and PSD is largely unexplored. Corporate political trans-
parency has significant implications for the firm and its shareholders. Several studies
found divergence of interests and potential differences between managers and owners
regarding firms’ political strategies (Aggarwal et al., 2012; Ozer & Alakent, 2013). Due
to the uncertain nature and inherent complexity of firm’s political disclosures, share-
holders experience information asymmetries when evaluating the success of their politi-
cal investments. Additionally, executives may conduct riskier and short-term strategic
political decisions that exhibit managerial opportunism. Therefore, shareholders have
become more vigilant about questioning political investments’ returns and demanding
more transparent PSD. Yet existing scholarship, investigating the influence of ownership
on corporate political strategy, has not examined how shareholders view PSD; much of
the existing research has instead examined how ownership structure influences lobbying
expenses or PAC (Hadani, 2007; Ozer & Alakent, 2013), which only partially reflect firm’s
PSD. We address this gap in our study.
3. Theoretical framework and hypotheses development
Theoretical foundations of voluntary disclosure in general and PSD in particular predo-
minantly originate from the agency theory. Agency theory assumes goal-conflict between
principals and agents, self-interest by each party and an information asymmetry gap
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). It indicates that firms utilise different sources to allay infor-
mation asymmetry. In this case, firms may voluntarily disclose their political partici-
pation activities to decrease the differences between owners’ expectations and
company’s performance and to persuade shareholders that executives are performing
according to shareholders’ interests. Furthermore, agency costs could be minimised
through corporate governance regulations such as independent and diverse directors.
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Given the information asymmetry gap and managers’ unwillingness to disclose their pol-
itical spending, corporate governance through ownership structure (Connelly et al.,
2010) rather than regulation (Okike & Adegbite, 2012) may motivate corporations to
be politically transparent. However, as not all owners have the same motivations and pre-
ferences, we argue that certain owners may have incentives to reduce corporate political
transparency to maintain their influence.
Signalling theory (Hughes, 1986; Morris, 1987; Spence, 1973) indicates that increased
disclosure signals the quality of the firm, and thus reduces adverse selection risk. While
firms issue PSD to signal their commitment to political transparency, their readiness to
respond to shareholders’ demand for PSD and their credibility about political contri-
butions (Deboskey et al., 2018a), proprietary cost concerns can disincentivize firms to
voluntarily disclose information regarding their political activities and spending. Follow-
ing this, political spending can be seen as a classification of spending that exhibits pro-
prietary information including corporate regulatory changes and political connections
(Baloria et al., 2019). In this case, disclosure of such sensitive information can attract
investor activism and public attention that can otherwise be evaded. Observably, Sche-
pers and Gardberg (2011) argue that companies seem to be less transparent when they
participate heavily in political activities.
In sum, while agency theory suggests that firms use PSD to reduce information asym-
metry, relieve shareholders and obtain legitimacy, certain owners may have motivations
to reduce PSD. Notably, existing evidence reveals that different shareholders have diver-
gent, rather than convergent, views about corporate strategic decisions. Accordingly, the
ownership structure-PSD nexus may vary depending on the percentage of stocks owned
by heterogeneous owners. Hence, we analyse our research (which is hinged on the ques-
tion: what is the influence of ownership structure on PSD?) through the following four
hypotheses relating to different types of ownership.
3.1. Institutional Ownership
Institutional ownership has a substantial impact on organisational decisions and strat-
egies by having informational, influential and voting power advantages over other share-
holders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Since they usually own a significant proportion of
firms’ stock which is not expected to be sold in the short run, they are more attentive
to firm’s significant events and meetings than non-institutional shareholders. Although
some institutional investors have short-term profit incentives, the majority are interested
in long-term performance, which can be strengthened by good management practices
such as transparent reporting (Mahoney & Roberts, 2007). Siegel and Vitaliano (2007)
argue that institutional shareholders such as banks and pension funds provide credence
services, which are characterised by significant information asymmetry between these
institutions and their clients. They can signal their credibility and reliability to potential
clients, and thereby differentiate their services, through more transparent reporting
including that of PSD. In this case, institutional investors may insist on more PSD in
their investee firms. Similarly, institutional investors’ demand for more transparency is
well-documented in the literature (Baloria et al., 2019). Empirically, Goh et al. (2020)
provide evidence that institutional owners have significant positive relationship with
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PSD. Based on agency theory, if more PSD reduces institutional investors’ concerns
regarding corporate political performance, a positive relationship is expected. Formally:
H1: Institutional ownership is positively associated with the level of PSD.
3.2. Insider ownership
An effective mechanism to reduce agency problems is to provide stocks to managers as
this may align managers’ and shareholders’ interests. So, if managers hold a substantial
proportion of firm’s shares, they will implement decisions that increase shareholders’
wealth and reduce information asymmetry. Johnson and Greening (1999) support that
argument, showing a positive association between managerial ownership and CSR dis-
closures. Further, insiders with political connections tend to appoint one of the Big 4
auditors to enhance accounting information quality in order to convince shareholders
that insiders are not using their political connections to extract private benefits (Gued-
hami et al., 2014). However, if managerial ownership exceeds a certain limit, entrench-
ment effect may take place (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) state that when managers hold large portions of firms’ shares, they may have
motivations to decrease corporate disclosure to avoid public scrutiny, preserve their
influential voting power and serve their own interests. Chau and Gray (2002) reported
a negative relationship between insider ownership and voluntary disclosures. Regarding
PSD, on the one hand, managers with large portions of a firm’s shares may tend to be
more politically transparent to support their legitimacy from political parties. On the
other hand, self-interested managerial owners may have incentives to reduce corporate
political transparency to facilitate asset expropriation and insider trading. In a similar
vein, insiders with great share ownership may be so powerful that they do not consider
shareholders’ interests (Morck et al., 1988), and thereby, they may exhibit less political
transparency. Likewise, higher insider ownership can decrease dismissal risk, induce insi-
ders to influence firm’s disclosure practices based on their self-interest and allow insiders
to execute tighter control over corporate information flow and possession (Forst et al.,
2019). Therefore, higher insider ownership can reduce financial reporting informative-
ness and PSD transparency. Nevertheless, insider owners may strategically utilise the
time of political disclosures to conceal certain organisational practices. Ozer and
Alakent (2013) provided evidence that insider ownership is negatively associated with
firm’s relational political approach. Overall, we develop the following hypothesis:
H2: Insider ownership is negatively associated with the level of PSD.
3.3. Governmental ownership
The government has the compelling authority of the nation through laws and regulations
used to control the behaviour of all social actors at the personal and organisational levels
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Only a handful of studies have investigated the association
between governmental ownership and corporate transparency, making it a fertile area for
more research. While agency theory indicates that higher PSD can alleviate agency costs
between managers and the government as an influential owner, governmental ownership
can exacerbate agency costs through the impairment of effective managerial monitoring,
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including disclosure practices (Ntim et al., 2013). According to Ghazali (2007), govern-
ment-owned firms tend to be politically sensitive as their activities are more visible in the
public eye and there is a higher expectation that such firms will be responsible and con-
scious of their public duty. Furthermore, it is expected that government ownership will
create pressure for companies to be more transparent as the government is trusted by the
public and those companies would want to meet the public’s expectations (Muttakin &
Subramaniam, 2015), especially in developed economies. Following these lines of argu-
ments, we posit that government ownership motivates managers to be more politically
transparent, thereby increasing PSD. In the same vein, governmental owners may motiv-
ate corporate political transparency to convince shareholders that corporate insiders with
political connections are not behaving opportunistically. Empirically, Khan et al. (2013),
Muttakin and Subramaniam (2015), Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) and Alshbili et al.
(2018) provide evidence that government ownership has positive effects on the extent
of voluntary disclosure. However, other studies report that government ownership
lowers corporate transparency (Dam & Scholtens, 2012; Raimo et al., 2020). Despite
mixed evidence, we predict positive association. Formally:
H3: Governmental ownership is positively associated with PSD.
3.4. Foreign ownership
Foreign shareholders face greater information asymmetry than domestic shareholders
because of geographical separation, lack of knowledge of local operating environments
and language barriers between shareholders and management (Huafang & Jianguo,
2007). Likewise, Mangena and Tauringana (2007) state that foreign shareholders incur
more agency costs when investing in a foreign country. Further, Khanna et al. (2004)
reveal that foreign shareholders from countries with better disclosure standards
request higher disclosures to allay information asymmetry. One way for companies to
signal their trustworthiness, reduce information asymmetry and minimise home bias
for foreign shareholders is to increase their PSD. Analogously, Haniffa and Cooke
(2005) show that managers use voluntary environmental and social disclosures to legit-
imise themselves, satisfy foreign investors and encourage flows of foreign capital. Follow-
ing this, we argue that managers may use PSD to reduce agency problems among foreign
investors and to aid their decision making. However, if foreign ownership became sub-
stantial, companies would be less motivated to obtain equity finance from the domestic
market as the funds are obtained from the foreign market (Laidroo, 2009). Accordingly,
foreign shareholders’ demand for public information including political spending may
decrease. Given the exploratory nature of this study, and as the literature is limited on
PSD drivers, we develop a null hypothesis for this variable:
H4: Foreign ownership is not associated with PSD.
4. Research methodology
4.1. Data and Sample
Our initial sample included all companies listed in the S&P 500 index with available Dis-
closure Index and Corporate Political Accountability data supplied by the CPA-Zicklin
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Center for a period of four years from 2015 to 2018.4 After removing companies with
missing accounting variables, and firms with missing data in the CPA-Zicklin database
in all years,5 the final sample consisted of 382 firms with 1,528 firm-year observations.
Table 1 reports industry classification and the number of firms in each industry. It indi-
cates an uneven distribution between 11 industrial classifications. However, such an
imbalance will not influence our analysis as the adoption of a panel dataset overcomes
this concern (Baltagi, 2008; Gujarati, 2003). Our data, including financial information,
ownership structure and corporate lobbying expenses, were collected from Bloomberg,
Bloomberg Terminal Ownership Summary and CRP.
4.2. Variables and model
To answer our research questions, we use the following empirical model as follows:
PSD = b0 + b1INSTITUT + b2INSIDER+ b3GOV + b4FOREIGN
+ Firm Controls+ Year Indicators+ Industry Indicators+ 1 (1)
4.2.1. Dependent variable: political spending disclosure (PSD)
Using the CPA-Zicklin Index (Baloria et al., 2019; Deboskey et al., 2018a, 2018b; DeBos-
key et al., 2020; Deboskey & Luo, 2018; Goh et al., 2020), PSD Index for each company in
each year was calculated based on a total of 24 items, which we classified into three major
dimensions: disclosure, policy and oversight.6 The disclosure sub-index indicates
whether firms disclose political contributions to government associations, trade associ-
ations, tax-exempt organisations, political parties, candidates or any other political
organisation. The policy sub-index indicates whether the company discloses their pol-
icies regarding political spending and recipients’ characteristics. The oversight sub-
index considers the standards of board committees that are responsible for approvals
and reviews of political spending, including their composition. It also indicates
whether the firm publicly produces a political spending report and the internal processes
to ensure compliance with policy. Full PSD index indicators and score assignments are
provided in the online Appendix.
4.2.2. Independent and control variables
In this study, the main independent variables represent different forms of ownership. To
start with, institutional ownership (INSTITUT) is the percentage of shares held by insti-
tutions (Goh et al., 2020). Insider ownership (INSIDER) is the proportion of shares
4It starts with 2015 because 2015 is the first year in which data about entire S&P 500 companies became available. For
example, in 2011, CPA-Zicklin database was available for only top 100 firms in S&P 500 index. In 2012 and 2013, CPA-
Zicklin database was available for only top 200 firms in S&P 500 index. In 2014, CPA-Zicklin database was available for
only top 300 firms in S&P 500 index. The period ends with 2018, the most recent annual reports available at the time of
the analysis.
5Following previous studies (Hany, 2012; Jonas, 2011; Ntim, 2016; Ntim et al., 2013), this criteria ensured that our data will
be classified as a balanced panel data. There are many benefits of employing panel data such as less multicollinearity
amongst variables and incorporating both cross-sectional and time-series observations (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge,
2010).
6The CPA-Zicklin Index is a unique dataset provided by the Carol and Lawrence Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research
of the Wharton School of University of Pennsylvania and the CPA.
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directly held by executives or managers (Ozer & Alakent, 2013). Governmental owner-
ship (GOV) is the percentage of shares owned by the government (Ntim et al., 2013).
Foreign ownership (FOREIGN) is the percentage of shares held by foreign investors
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Khan et al., 2013). The definitions and measurements of all vari-
ables are summarised in Table 2.
Following prior studies (Chan et al., 2014; Goh et al., 2020; Hyun et al., 2014; Irani &
Oesch, 2013; Peters & Romi, 2014; Yekini et al., 2015), this study covers a number of
control variables which potentially influence PSD including performance (ROA), lever-
age (LEV), size (SIZE), governance quality (GOVERNANCE), analyst following
(ANALYST) and growth opportunities (TOBINSQ). Furthermore, Ali et al. (2014)
provide evidence that industry concentration influences firm’s disclosure strategy. Simi-
larly, Goh et al. (2020) claim that a firm’s industry concentration can represent the firm’s
proprietary costs and may influence its disclosure strategy. So, we control for industry
competition as a proxy for proprietary costs. Further, while disclosures of political activi-
ties are voluntary for businesses, the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 requires the dis-
closure of firms’ lobbying expenditures and their PAC contributions. Therefore, we
control for corporate lobbying expenditures from CRP. Finally, we include both industry
and year-fixed effects. Industry indicators are based on the Global Industry Classification
standard codes (GICS).
Since the period of our study could be influenced by the 2016 US elections, we
tested the presence of such changing trends in our analysis. We used the Chow test
for 2015–2016 and 2017–2018 periods. Untabulated results indicate that there are
no structural breaks in our variables. To minimise the influence of outliers, we win-
sorized all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Following Wang and
Hussainey (2013) and Yekini et al. (2015), the analysis was conducted using the
Random Effects (RE) estimator with Generalised Least Square (GLS) regression
after executing the Breusch–Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for panel data.
Further, random effect panel regression mitigates potential problems caused by unob-
served firm effect (autocorrelation) and time effect (heteroscedasticity). It also controls
for residual dependency problems that are often ignored in market-based accounting
research (Gow et al., 2010).
Table 1. Industry classification and number of firms in each industry.
GICS (Global Industry Classification standard) Number of companies Percentage
Health Care 44 11.52%
Industrials 55 14.39%
Information Technology 51 13.35%
Consumer Staples 28 7.33%
Utilities 26 6.81%
Financials 52 13.61%
Real Estate 19 4.97%
Consumer Discretionary 57 14.92%
Energy 27 7.07%
Materials 20 5.23%
Telecommunication Services 3 0.78%
Total 382 100%
Note: This table presents number and proportion of firms in each industry based on GICS (Global Industry Classification
Standard).
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5. Results and discussions
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics are reported in panel A of Table 3. The mean score of PSD is 46.46.
The maximum is 100 and the minimum is 0, indicating a large variance across firms
regarding their political transparency. INSTITUT has a mean score of 90.79, with a
maximum of 99 and a minimum of 59.24, indicating that institutional investors
control most S&P 500 firms.7 INSIDER has a mean score of 1.72, with a maximum of
20.97 and a minimum of 0.02, indicating that S&P 500 firms are still providing their man-
agers considerable stock ownership to incentivise them for better performance and to
reduce agency conflicts. GOV has a mean score of 1.353, with a maximum of 2.59 and
a minimum of 0, indicating limited state participation. FOREIGN has a mean of 18.35,
indicating a considerable presence of foreign investors. GOVERNANCE has a mean of
60.60, suggesting superior governance disclosure in S&P 500 firms. Companies had an
average annual lobbying expenditure of $1,848,869, as reported under the Lobbying Dis-
closure Act of 1995.8 Panel B of Table 3 reports the degree of within and between groups’
Table 2. Definition of variables.
Variable Definition and Measurement References
PSD Political Spending Disclosure Index Percentage, measured by total
summed raw score of the CPA-Zicklin Index divided by total points of
72 (CPA–Zicklin data items 1–24)
Goh et al. (2020)
INSTITUT Institutional Ownership, which is measured as the percentage of shares
held by institutions to the number of float shares outstanding
Goh et al. (2020); Ozer and
Alakent (2013)
INSIDER Insider Ownership, which is percentage of shares directly held by
individuals who are in firm management
Ozer and Alakent (2013)
GOV Governmental Ownership, which is measured by percentage of shares
owned by the government
Ntim et al. (2013)
FOREIGN Foreign Ownership, which is measured by percentage of shares held by
foreign investors
Haniffa and Cooke (2005);
Khan et al. (2013)
ROA Return on Asset, which is measured by net income divided by average
total assets
Elamer et al. (2019)
LEV Leverage, which is measured by total liabilities divided by total assets Yekini et al. (2015)
ANALYST Measured as the total number of analysts recommending for the
security, at the end of each fiscal year
Deboskey et al. (2018b); Irani
and Oesch (2013)
TOBINSQ Calculated as follows: the market value of equity plus the book value of
total liabilities, preferred stocks and minority interest divided by the
book value of total assets
Peters and Romi (2014)
SIZE Measured as the natural log of the market value of equity Goh et al. (2020)
GOVERNANCE Governance Quality, which is a proprietary Bloomberg score
depending on firm’s governance disclosure of environmental, social,
and governance (ESG) data. This score ranges from 0 for firms that do
not disclose governance data to 100 for firms that disclose maximum
governance data
Deboskey et al. (2018a)
IndustryCon The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is measured as the
aggregated value of the square of the market share of each firm
competing in the industry (based on the Fama-French 48-industry
classifications). A high HHI implies high industry concentration or low
competition.
Berger and Hann (2007); Goh
et al. (2020)
LobbyExp Annual lobbying spending (in $millions). We divided this number by
1,000,000 to make the coefficient more interpretable.
Chen et al. (2015)
7This is consistent with Mcgrath (2017) who noted that institutional investors own about 80% of S&P 500 firms.
8Since some political spending can be conducted through financial intermediaries, and thereby remains undisclosed in
any public record, reported lobbying expenditures tend to be largely understated (Kong et al., 2017).
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variances. A greater level of variance in PSD can be observed in between-group variance.
One possible explanation is the voluntary nature of PSD, leading to wide differences in
political reporting across firms. The larger proportion of between-group variation yields
more support for the use of RE. Panel B of Table 3 reports an increasing trend of PSD
over the years.
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics for PSD by industry. Firms in real estate have
the lowest average of 23.19 and firms in telecommunication services have the highest
average of 70.35. The consumer discretionary sector, which has the highest represen-
tation of our sample, has an average PSD of 36.79. Further, firms in certain industries
such as telecommunication services, utilities and health care make exceedingly high
PSD in comparison with real estate and consumer discretionary firms. This suggests
that firms’ PSD varies across different industries, implying that different business
sectors have inherent pressures to push firms to become politically transparent.
5.2. Correlation matrix
The correlation matrix in Table 5 reveals low correlation across all variables. Also, the
variance inflation factor (VIF) was computed to check the multicollinearity. The mean
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for all variables.
Panel A
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
PSD 1,528 46.47 33.90 0 100.00
INSTITUT 1,528 90.79 9.98 59.24 99.70
INSIDER 1,528 1.72 3.64 0.03 20.97
GOV 1,528 1.35 0.45 0 2.59
FOREIGN 1,528 18.35 6.57 7.69 45.77
ROA 1,528 6.19 6.44 (14.66) 24.32
LEV 1,528 29.92 17.17 0 82.11
ANALYST 1,528 22.84 7.77 6.00 46.00
TOBINSQ 1,528 2.19 1.28 0.95 7.27
LOGSIZE 1,528 4.41 0.42 3.68 5.55
GOVERNANCE 1,528 60.61 7.14 50.00 76.79
IndustryCon 1,528 0.20 0.17 0.04 1.00
LobbyExp 1,528 1,848,869 2,795,328 0 13,900,000
Panel B
Year Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
2015–2018 PSD overall 46.47 33.90 0.00 100.00 N = 1528
between 31.99 0.00 100.00 n = 382
within 11.30 −20.68 110.75 T = 4
2015 overall 42.10 32.95 0.00 100.00 N = 382
between 32.95 0.00 100.00 n = 382
within 0.00 42.10 42.10 T = 1
2016 overall 45.80 33.31 0.00 100.00 N = 382
between 33.31 0.00 100.00 n = 382
within 0.00 45.80 45.80 T = 1
2017 overall 47.89 34.28 0.00 100.00 N = 382
between 34.28 0.00 100.00 n = 382
within 0.00 47.89 47.89 T = 1
2018 overall 50.08 34.65 0.00 100.00 N = 382
between 34.65 0.00 100.00 n = 382
within 0.00 50.08 50.08 T = 1
Note: Panel A of this table presents the descriptive statistics of all variables. For variable definitions, see Table 2. Panel B of
this table presents the degree of within and between group variances of PSD each year.
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VIF is 1.78, which is much lower than 10 and indicates that there is no issue of multicol-
linearity. The correlations between PSD and (GOV and LobbyingExp) are significantly
positive. However, the correlations between PSD and (INSTITUT and INSIDER) are sig-
nificantly negative, indicating that higher institutional, and insider ownership structures
is correlated with lower PSD.
5.3. Results and discussions
5.3.1. PSD and ownership structure
The results in Table 6 suggest that ownership structure has significant effects on the level
of PSD. These results are consistent with Ozer and Alakent (2013) who note that own-
ership structure affects corporate choices regarding political strategies. Specifically, we
find that institutional ownership is positively associated with PSD, supporting the first
hypothesis (H1). The importance of institutional ownership in relation to PSD ties in
with prior studies that found positive association between institutional ownership and
voluntary disclosures, such as earnings forecasts and CSR disclosures (Ajinkya et al.,
2005; Lin et al., 2018; Oh et al., 2011). This positive relationship implies that institutional
investors demand more political transparency from their investments. This may imply
that institutional investors such as financial institutions and banks may use PSD to
demonstrate their transparency to future clients and enhance their credibility (Bushee
& Noe, 2000). We also endeavour to gain deeper insights on the influence of institutional
ownership stability and concentration on PSD in the online Appendix.
In addition, our results show that insider ownership is negatively associated with PSD.
This confirms our second hypothesis (H2) and is consistent with prior studies (Elshan-
didy et al., 2013; Ghazali, 2007; Khan et al., 2013; Oh et al., 2011; Raimo et al., 2020).
However, this negative relationship should be considered with caution given that there
are possibilities that insiders (i.e. executives and managers) and politicians may
collude to extract private benefits (Guedhami et al., 2014). In doing so, managers and
politicians may insist on reducing PSD to avoid public scrutiny. Consistent with type
II agency conflict, we argue that self-interested managers may have incentives to
reduce PSD to facilitate asset expropriation, extract perquisites at the cost of minority
shareholders, manage informational possession in the firm and thereby safeguard them-
selves against political information leakage. As political information dissemination may
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for PSD according to industry.
PSD Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Consumer Discretionary 228 36.79 30.62 0 97.14
Consumer Staples 112 52.08 30.94 0 94.29
Energy 108 55.12 27.93 0 100
Financials 208 54.07 36.54 0 100
Health Care 176 57.32 32.27 0 100
Industrials 220 41.14 32.07 0 97.14
Information Technology 204 39.23 37.81 0 100
Materials 80 44.18 32.76 0 97.14
Real Estate 76 23.20 27.99 0 94.29
Telecommunication Services 12 70.36 6.62 58.57 81.43
Utilities 104 60.56 28.27 5.71 97.14
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics for PSD in each industry based on GICS (Global Industry Classification
Standard).






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































have severe corporate reputational risks (Deboskey & Luo, 2018), insiders with higher
share ownership may issue less transparent PSD to prevent public accountability and
stock price fluctuation. As Prabhat and Primo (2019) provide evidence that mandating
corporate political donations is associated with greater corporate risk and stock price
volatility, we add to this insight by arguing that insiders with greater share ownership
may prefer to decrease PSD to maintain firm’s stock price stability. Similarly, Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) argue that when managers have a high percentage of firm’s stocks,
they are likely to reduce corporate disclosure (PSD in this case). Drawing on agency
theory, while managerial ownership should incentivise managers to be more transparent,
this may not be applicable to all kinds of accounting disclosures, especially risky ones
such as PSD.
In terms of the impact of governmental ownership, Table 6 shows that it is positively
associated with PSD, which clarifies findings from prior studies that government owner-
ship fosters corporate transparency (Eng & Mak, 2003; Khan et al., 2013; Ntim et al.,
2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). This result confirms our third hypothesis (H3) and
finds support in the argument of Muttakin and Subramaniam (2015), who claim that
since the government is trusted by the public and would demand to meet the public’s
expectation, governmental ownership creates pressures for firms to be more transparent.
Since state-owned enterprises may attract attention from the public, it is expected that
Table 6. Main regression results.









ROA −0.047 −0.045 −0.055 −0.048 −0.072
(0.098) (0.103) (0.103) (0.106) (0.104)
LEV 0.080 0.076 0.072 0.077 0.068
(0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
ANALYST −0.074 −0.075 −0.064 −0.070 −0.061
(0.125) (0.158) (0.157) (0.157) (0.156)
TOBINSQ −3.377*** −3.004*** −3.262*** −3.191*** −3.180***
(0.912) (0.952) (0.945) (0.950) (0.961)
SIZE 16.936*** 14.607*** 14.634*** 15.748*** 13.999***
(2.879) (3.090) (3.073) (3.044) (3.152)
GOVERNANCE 0.815*** 0.785*** 0.786*** 0.806*** 0.748***
(0.108) (0.129) (0.129) (0.129) (0.128)
IndustryCon −15.543* −15.234* −14.521* −14.518* −14.880*
(8.767) (7.880) (7.881) (7.933) (7.916)
LobbyExp 2.040*** 1.884*** 2.039*** 2.000*** 2.055***
(0.433) (0.475) (0.475) (0.477) (0.483)
Constant −85.799*** −58.620*** −65.406*** −69.220*** −76.413***
(14.911) (14.868) (14.403) (14.484) (17.627)
Overall R2 0.343 0.353 0.344 0.344 0.353
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,528 1,528 1,528 1,528 1,528
Note: This table presents our main results regarding the influence of ownership structure (INSTITUT, INSIDER, GOV, and
FOREIGN) on PSD. For variable definitions, see Table 2. The above table represents regression coefficients and standard
errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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they behave more transparently regarding their political participation. We argue that as
governmental ownership increases, the issue of public accountability becomes very
important and influential in firm’s political strategies. Such companies tend to exhibit
greater political transparency to ensure organisational legitimacy.
Finally, we do not find a statistically significant relationship between foreign owner-
ship and PSD, supporting our fourth null hypothesis (H4). Our justification is that
foreign investors, who suffer from information asymmetry, may not be fully aware of
the local political environment and events that occur in other countries, leading to
indifference towards PSD. Also, this insignificant relationship can be justified through
the increasingly restricted laws regarding foreign ownership in the US, which minimise
foreign-influenced political spending (Sozan, 2019).
5.3.2. PSD and firm specific characteristics
PSD is significantly higher for firms with larger size (SIZE) and better governance quality
(GOVERNANCE) and lower for firms with more growth opportunities (TOBINSQ). Lob-
bying expenses (LobbyExp) is positively associated with PSD. This can be attributed to
signalling, materiality and the desire to alleviate shareholders’ concerns by increasing
transparency regarding such expenditures (Kong et al., 2017). The level of industry con-
centration is negatively associated with PSD, indicating that firms exhibit more PSD in
the case of lower industry concentration (higher industry competition). This finding is
consistent with the argument that industry competition increases the difficulty of secur-
ing external funds, represented by a higher cost of capital. Hence, PSD can lessen infor-
mation asymmetry and improve access to external capital (Valta, 2012). Our findings are
also consistent with DeBoskey et al. (2020) who provide evidence of a negative associ-
ation between political transparency and cost of debt, and with Isidro and Marques
(2020) who provide evidence of the positive association between industry competition
and firm transparency of non-GAAP disclosures.
We present our robustness and sensitivity analysis in the online Appendix. Our results
are robust with alternative regression clustered by firm, different proxy for PSD, control-
ling for political connections, endogeneity tests, and various estimation models.
6. Analysis of mechanisms
In this section, we explore the channels through which ownership characteristics affect
PSD. We argue that the effect of ownership structure variables on PSD may change
based on different contexts and circumstances. Investigating these channels is important
as owners have different preferences regarding corporate political strategies. As such,
studying these mechanisms can deepen our understanding regarding ownership struc-
ture-PSD nexus. As foreign ownership does not show significant results, we suppress
the estimated coefficients on foreign ownership in Table 7 and in the remaining tables
for brevity.
6.1. Issue-specific lobbying expenditures and tax avoidance
Regarding lobbying expenditures, we chose the three largest categories (Federal Budget &
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according to the CRP, from 2015 to 2018.9 We then created interaction variables between
ownership structure variables and certain lobbying expenditures in Table 7. Observably,
the coefficient of INSIDER*Taxes is significant and positive at 1%, offering new evidence
that the insider owners exhibit greater political transparency if they are pursing tax-lob-
bying activities. Since aggressive tax planning is one potential way through which corpor-
ate insiders can extract rents (Desai et al., 2007), managerial rent extraction through tax
lobbying may incentivise corporate insiders to limit PSD. However, insider owners may
increase PSD when they engage in tax-lobbying to convince the public that insiders are
not extracting private benefits through aggressive tax planning. This appears to confirm
that politicians and insiders, who insist on lobbying for certain issues, specifically tax-
issues, may collude and reduce PSD to extract private benefits (Guedhami et al., 2014),
but some pressures (e.g. from social activists demanding information regarding political
influence on corporate tax) may force them to increase PSD. In this case, insider owners
may increase PSD to convince the public that they are not behaving opportunistically
through tax lobbying. These findings are consistent with the idea of tax planning
being a means through which insiders can divert corporate resources, which could
explain why certain stakeholders demand more PSD for tax-related lobbying activities.10
Another argument is that tax-lobbying expenditures are spent on official state entities,
meaning that these expenditures are kept in public records and can hardly be disguised.
Therefore, insiders may increase PSD in such cases to reduce agency costs.
In the light of our prior findings, as well as previous research suggesting that aggres-
sive tax planning exacerbates agency costs (Bauer et al., 2020) and those indicating
insider owners’ tendency towards tax avoidance (Cabello et al., 2019), we investigate
how tax avoidance strategies operationalise the ownership structure-PSD nexus. Follow-
ing prior studies (Hoopes et al., 2012; Huseynov et al., 2017; McClure et al., 2018), we use
cash Effective Tax Rate (ETR), instead of GAAP ETR, as our proxy for tax avoidance
which is calculated as percentage of cash tax payments to pretax book income.11
Lower values of cash ETR represent higher level of tax avoidance. Interestingly, we
find the coefficient of INSIDER*CASHETR in Table 8 to be negative and significant, indi-
cating that insider owners exhibit more PSD when they engage in tax avoidance strat-
egies. We interpret this interesting result in the light of the following arguments. First,
as the demand for PSD has intensified significantly in the latest years, it is important
for insiders with incentives to reduce tax payments to increase their engagement with
PSD practices as this may develop a positive public perception regarding firm’s ethical
conduct and political transparency. This argument is in line with agency theory and
with prior research that managers engaging in tax avoidance strategies tend to exhibit
more ESG disclosures to create positive media reputation (Laguir et al., 2015; Lin
9We were unable to identify how much of annual lobbying expenses were directed toward each issue. However, CRP
provides data regarding types and number of lobbied issues. So, we adopted Brown et al. (2015) methodology for cal-
culating issue-specific lobbying expenditures by dividing number of specific issues by all other issues. We then multi-
plied this ratio by total amount of lobbying expenses to obtain issue-specific lobbying expenditures.
10For example, the coefficient of INSTITUT*Taxes is significant and positive at 1%, suggesting that institutional investors
demand more PSDs when firms pursue tax-related lobbying expenditures.
11Please refer to Huseynov et al. (2017) and McClure et al. (2018) for details on how cash ETR has many improvements
over GAAP ETR. We follow prior research and subtract other special items from the pretax book income as they can
introduce some volatility in our tax avoidance measure (Dyreng et al., 2008; Minnick & Noga, 2010). Following prior
research, Cash ETR is winsorized at 0 and 1 (Hjelström et al., 2020). We collected the data necessary to calculate tax
avoidance from Compustat.
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et al., 2017). Second, given prior evidence that politically connected firms are more likely
to engage in tax avoidance tactics (Kim & Zhang, 2016), and that insiders owners utilise
tax avoidance to expropriate wealth from shareholders (Cabello et al., 2019; McGuire
et al., 2014), insiders owners, especially entrenched managers with great share ownership,
may increase PSD. They may do this as a mechanism of gaining legitimisation from their
political connections to facilitate their exploitation of corporate resources. We further
argue that insider owners may strategically utilise the timing of claiming political trans-
parency to conceal their tax avoidance strategies. Our evidence is also in line with Sikka
(2010) who argue that firms claiming social conduct practices indulge in tax avoidance
and evasion. Overall, we provide evidence that insider owners exhibit more PSD if
they are pursing tax-related lobbying expenses and tax avoidance.
6.2. Non-financial disclosure quality and financial reporting quality
It can be argued that firm’s PSD behaviour is influenced by its overall reporting strategy
and the level of information asymmetry. Namely, firms with higher PSD could be firms
with superior non-financial disclosure quality and financial reporting quality (DeBoskey
et al., 2020). Also, prior research suggests that politically connected firms are more
opaque and have lower financial reporting quality (Chaney et al., 2011). Since different
owners have divergent preferences toward firm’s political transparency, their orien-
tations toward PSD can differ because of different levels of information asymmetry
and overall reporting quality. For example, influential owners such as institutional and
governmental owners, who already have access to corporate private and confidential
information (Raimo et al., 2020), may demand lower PSD for firms with lower levels
of information asymmetry. Therefore, we investigate how non-financial reporting
quality and financial reporting quality operationalise the ownership structure-PSD
Table 8. Analysis of mechanisms – tax avoidance.
Variables 1 2 3














Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Constant −82.904*** −59.761*** −67.880***
(17.663) (15.218) (14.704)
Overall R2 0.344 0.355 0.344
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,508 1,508 1,508
Note: This table presents how tax avoidance (CASHETR) operationalises ownership structure-PSD interaction. For variable
definitions, see Table 2. The above table represents regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. *** p <
0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
20 H. ALI ET AL.
nexus. We follow prior research and use the Bloomberg governance score as proxy for
nonfinancial reporting quality (DeBoskey et al., 2020). To proxy for financial reporting
quality, we follow McNichols (2002) and draw our measure for accruals quality based
on the absolute value of Accruals Estimation Errors (Abs_AEE) (see the online Appendix
for more details).
Observably, the coefficient of GOV*GOVERNANCE in Table 9 is significantly nega-
tive, implying that governmental owners’ demand for PSD is lower in firms with
higher nonfinancial reporting quality. It seems that governmental owners heavily rely
on governance quality in demanding PSD. This provides evidence that governmental
ownership and governance quality can be substitutive, instead of complementary, in
their impact on PSD. This suggests that governmental owners’ monitoring over corpor-
ate political activities is weaker in firms with higher environmental, social and govern-
ance (ESG) disclosures. Additionally, governmental owners’ presence may allay
information asymmetry because such owners have inherent authority to acquire political
information from other privileged sources, even in the obscurity of political reporting
(Raimo et al., 2020). So, governmental ownership, especially in firms with higher nonfi-
nancial reporting quality, may push firms to issue less PSD.
Similarly, the coefficient of GOV*Abs_AEE in Table 10 is significantly positive, implying
that the positive relationship between governmental ownership and PSD is more pro-
nounced in firms with poorer financial reporting quality. In other words, governmental
owners demand lower PSD in firms with higher financial reporting quality. This finding
is consistent with our earlier analysis that governmental owners demand for transparent
PSD is lower in firms with greater non-financial reporting quality. Overall, our findings
are consistent with the notion that demand for more PSD is higher when information asym-
metry is higher (Bhattacharya et al., 2013; S. Brown & Hillegeist, 2007; Eliwa et al., 2019).
Table 9. Analysis of mechanisms – nonfinancial reporting quality.
Variables 1 2 3














Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Constant −106.532 −60.890*** −88.521***
(81.801) (14.582) (17.240)
Overall R2 0.342 0.35 0.345
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,528 1,528 1,528
Note: This table presents how nonfinancial reporting quality (GOVERNANCE) operationalises ownership structure-PSD
interaction. For variable definitions, see Table 2. The above table represents regression coefficients and standard
errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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6.3. Industry concentration
Prior evidence suggests that the level of industry concentration shapes corporate disclos-
ure policy (Ali et al., 2014). Similarly, it is possible that industry concentration level may
change owners’ perceptions regarding corporate political disclosure policy as different
industry concentration and competition levels may have inherent forces that can
change owners’ preferences for political transparency. Correspondingly, we explore
whether and how industry concentration level operationalises the interactions between
ownership structure characteristics and PSD. We observe that the coefficient of INSTI-
TUT *IndustryCon in Table 11 is negative and significant at 1%, implying that insti-
tutional investors demand more PSD in the case of lower industry concentration or
higher industry competition. Given the recent evidence that corporate political transpar-
ency reduces firm’s cost of debt (DeBoskey et al., 2020), institutional owners may insist
on increasing PSD of their investee firms when they are operating in high competition
environment to ease their access to external funds. Given the difficulty of securing exter-
nal capital in industries with intensive competition, institutional owners can reduce
information asymmetry by pressing firms to enhance PSD to reduce investee firms’
cost of debt. This finding is in line with the premises of agency theory regarding the
monitoring function of institutional ownership and with prior research that institutional
ownership stability reduces corporate cost of debt (Elyasiani et al., 2010).
Overall, the results of the cross-sectional analyses indicate that the relationship
between ownership structure and PSD depends on contingencies or conditions that cor-
porations face. Consistent with agency theory, they indicate that different shareholders
have divergent preferences regarding political transparency. Also, the foregoing shows
how critical it is to consider the channels or mechanisms that configure the interactions
between different owners and PSD such as issue-specific lobbying expenditures, the
Table 10. Analysis of mechanisms – financial reporting quality.
Variables 1 2 3














Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Constant −92.178*** −60.200*** −62.878***
(16.474) (13.710) (13.198)
Overall R2 0.337 0.346 0.336
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,417 1,417 1,417
Note: This table presents how financial reporting quality (Abs_AEE) operationalises ownership structure-PSD interaction.
For variable definitions, see Table 2. The above table represents regression coefficients and standard errors in parenth-
eses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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degree of tax avoidance, nonfinancial and financial reporting quality and industry con-
centration as these mechanisms uniquely operationalise ownership-structure-PSD nexus.
7. Conclusion
Significant funds that corporations devote to political activities highlights the need for
better understanding of the drivers of corporate political transparency. Using a sample
from S&P 500 firms between 2015 and 2018, our study sheds light on these drivers,
advancing the literature on the ownership structure-PSD nexus. First, our findings
show that ownership structures play a vital role in shaping a firm’s PSD. Second, while
institutional ownership has a positive association with PSD, institutional owners
demand more PSD in firms operating in higher competition. Third, we provide evidence
that insider ownership negatively affects PSD, but insider owners exhibit more PSD for
firms that engage in tax-lobbying activities and tax avoidance tactics. Fourth, govern-
mental owners demand more PSD, but this demand is lower in firms with higher nonfi-
nancial and financial reporting quality. Therefore, our findings suggest that the effect of
ownership structure on PSD is contingent upon mechanisms that the operationalise
ownership structure-PSD nexus such as issue-specific lobbying expenditures, tax avoid-
ance, nonfinancial and financial reporting quality and industry concentration. Put
together, these contributions to the literature shed light on the determinants of PSD –
an important, yet relatively unexplored, disclosure practice.
Our study has several implications for regulators and policy makers. First, regulators
should prevent corporate insiders from holding significant proportions of shares because
large ownership worsens corporate political transparency. Second, our results show that
Table 11. Analysis of mechanisms – industry concentration.
Variables 1 2 3














Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Constant −108.763*** −58.125*** −64.657***
(20.228) (14.844) (14.727)
Overall R2 0.343 0.353 0.344
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,528 1,528 1,528
Note: This table presents how industry concentration (IndustryCon) operationalises ownership structure-PSD interaction.
For variable definitions, see Table 2. The above table represents regression coefficients and standard errors in parenth-
eses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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different shareholders have divergent or competing views regarding PSD.12 Accordingly,
companies should create more developed intervention mechanisms including specialised
political committees (see: Deboskey et al., 2018a) or PSD-focused divisions to handle
conflicting views. Third, it is important to consider various boundary conditions includ-
ing issue-specific lobbying expenditures, tax avoidance, nonfinancial and financial
reporting quality and industry concentration in order to better understand how owner-
ship structure drives PSD. Further, the increasing PSD indicates that efforts by many sta-
keholders (such as the UK Parliament, US Congress and some professional institutions
such as the Chartered Financial Analyst Institute) are having a positive influence at
enhancing political reporting.13 However, as PSD is voluntary in nature, we recommend
more attention to be paid to PSD quality. Namely, regulatory authorities can strengthen
political reporting by informing managers to make “forward-looking” and “quantitative-
oriented” political disclosures. We also suggest using a disclosure framework that satisfies
the minimum criterion of reliability and relevance. For example, adopting a PSD frame-
work consistent with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) can provide companies with
standards, guidelines and rules regarding PSD, increasing its comparability, consistency,
understandability and readability across firms. Furthermore, given that PSD information
is dispersed in many places because of separate filings requirements with different organ-
isations, making their collection a time-consuming process, we suggest the unification of
the political reporting process into a single “political performance report”. Our results
will help regulators and policy makers in framing legislation and regulatory reforms to
make ameliorations in both PSD and corporate governance. We acknowledge that the
statistical relationships presented in our study do not necessarily imply causal relations.
Since our disclosure and governance proxies may not fully represent managerial practice
in totality, future research may utilise qualitative approaches such as case studies, inter-
views and observations. Also, given the rapid growing attention on political issues, we call
for more research investigating the divers of corporate political spending transparency as
it becomes an inescapable priority for businesses.
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